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Plan, Siphoning, and Corruption in the Soviet
Command Economy
Introduction
In a much cited article Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1992) presented a
simple model to explain the shortages and excess demands characteristic of state–
socialist command economies. In their framework the main feature of a “socialist
industry” is monopoly: the industry may comprise one firm or many but, if many,
then the latter behave collectively like a monopolist, collusion being enforced by the
fundholding ministry. The industry equates marginal revenue with marginal cost. But
the state fixes prices, meets all production costs, and collects all revenue accruing at
official prices. Therefore it is the official price, not production costs, that defines the
industry’s internal cost schedule. The industry can gain a net revenue only by
extracting a bribe from consumers on top of the official price. The industry sets its
output where the official price equals marginal revenue from bribes. Compared with
any given market–clearing combination of price and output, the industry always
wants to cut both price and output. Below we call this the Shleifer–Vishny conjecture.
One motivation professed by Shleifer and Vishny was a desire to explain
pervasive consumer shortages without reference to the “soft budget constraint”
hypothesis advanced by Kornai (1980) or to aggregate demand and repressed
inflation: “In Kornai’s model it is not so much that goods are underpriced, but that the
income of the buyers is effectively infinite. This model may be appropriate for some
intermediate goods. But households face hard budget constraints, and therefore the
systematic shortages of many consumer goods remain a puzzle”.1 In fact a theoretical
solution to this puzzle had long been available in the Sovietological literature (Kaser,
1975; Birman, 1980; Kornai, 1980): “siphoning”. A soft budget constraint for firms
could result in shortages for consumers if firms’ demand for inputs spilled over into
retail outlets, siphoning resources intended for final consumption back into
intemediate use. However, the existence of siphoning remained conjectural,
especially since it required firms to be able to mobilise cash illicitly. Even if
siphoning occurred its scale and significance remained doubtful. If it was significant,
it was unclear why the authorities tolerated it.
More recently Mathias Dewatripont and Eric Maskin, Yingyi Qian, and Byung–
Yeon Kim have provided all the pieces necessary for this puzzle to be solved.
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) showed how centralization of credit leads to a soft
budget constraint in the context of sunk costs and contract renegotiation. Within a
similar framework Qian (1994) showed that when state–owned enterprises compete
with households for goods that may be used in both consumption and production,
non–market clearing prices may improve efficiency by allowing household
consumption to crowd out some bad projects that would otherwise proceed. Finally,
Kim (2000) showed from postwar archival records that Soviet firms and budgetary
organisations did engage in siphoning, that there were unofficial demand spillovers in
addition to those that were officially sanctioned, and that siphoning made a
substantial contribution to repressed inflation and a growing monetary overhang in
the Soviet retail market. In particular, he found that in two postwar subperiods of
reduced containment of inflation in factory prices enterprises used their additional
liquidity to raise their purchases in the retail market more rapidly.
                                                
1 Wintrobe (1998: 198) echoed this doubt: firms’ soft budget constraint explains
why “firms always want more inputs than are available. […] However, this still does
not explain shortages in consumer markets, which were equally legendary in the
former Soviet Union”.
2In short, one original motivation behind the Shleifer–Vishny conjecture has been
eliminated. Moreover, the restatement of the soft budget constraint hypothesis must
weaken the analytical basis of the Shleifer–Vishny conjecture since the two are not
consistent: in the Shleifer–Vishny story firms limit outputs to increase shortages and
extract bribes, whereas in the story of the soft budget constraint they demand inputs
and limit outputs to conserve effort.
At the same time, the Shleifer–Vishny conjecture has had two important merits.
First, it has brought the issue of price–setting by enterprises in command economies
into sharper focus. With rare exceptions the formal models of the state–socialist firm
that are to be found in the traditional Sovietological literature ignored this issue,
assuming that enterprises faced prices that were exogenously fixed. 2  If enterprises
were free to set their own prices as they wished, how would they do so? The Shleifer–
Vishny conjecture suggested that they would set them as low as possible so as to
collect the maximum bribe. Second, the Shleifer–Vishny conjecture clearly contains
more than a grain of truth: many who lived in the shortage economy found ways of
deriving some corrupt benefit from its rigidities, and bribery was one of the most
common methods of reallocating commodities when supplies were short. Did it
follow that the rigidities themselves were created intentionally for the purpose of
distributing the bribes?
In this paper we proceed as follows. Part 1 uses the results of recent
investigations in the Russian state archives to establish some relevant stylised facts.
In particular, the orientation of Soviet producers toward their own–product plan
prices was exclusively inflationary, being motivated by the desire for an easier plan.
Further, producers strove continually to obtain above–plan liquidity for use in
siphoning; this extra liquidity could take the form of either higher prices or side
payments. In Part 2 we present a simple model of a resource–constrained firm under
command arrangements in which producers’ allocation of effort interacts with the
output target set by the planner. Part 3 extends the model to allow the firm to gain
hidden revenues that interact with its resource constraint through siphoning. At first
we treat these hidden revenues as exogenously given from some previous period. Part
4 extends our analysis to siphoning in continuous time. At each point we consider the
rationale for managers to engage in corruption and for planners to tolerate their
behaviour. Part 5 concludes.
1. What the archives show
1.1. Plan prices
Shleifer and Vishny’s story implies that firms always preferred lower prices to higher
ones. But there is absolutely no evidence of this preference ever being expressed
through firms’ investments in lobbying or negotiation. On the contrary, the evidence
that firms tried continually to negotiate prices upwards is abundant and
overwhelming.
To navigate this subject it is necessary to distinguish plan or estimate prices,
official factory wholesale prices, and retail prices (for more detail see Nove, 1977).
Accounting plan prices (neizmennye or sopostavimye tseny) were used as a fixed
standard of value in formulating plans for heterogeneous products denominated in
rubles and evaluating their fulfilment. Estimate prices (smetnye tseny) were used for
the same purpose in the case of unique construction projects. Official factory prices
were authorised by the centre, usually on the basis of actual direct costs plus an
allowance for overheads and, once authorised, were supposed to remain unchanged.
                                                
2 See for example Ames (1965). A notable feature of Shleifer and Vishny’s
(1992) model is that their planner is able to control prices perfectly if she wishes, yet
does not control quantities at all.
3Factory prices were those actually received by producers for output and credited to
their financial profit–and–loss accounts; the factory price with a further allowance for
transport and distribution costs (the “factory wholesale” price) was charged to users
including, in the case of consumer goods, the retail trade distribution system.
Accouting plan prices were usually based on factory prices of some base year which
was updated infrequently and could be long distant, unless the product concerned had
been introduced or upgraded at a more recent date, in which case the factory price of
that date was used. Finally, where products were designated for retail trade they also
carried a retail price; the difference between the retail price and the factory wholesale
price was the trade markup plus a variable–rate turnover tax (or minus a subsidy).
Consider first the importance of plan prices to the enterprise. Contrary to the
conventional stereotype of an economy subject to direct quantity regulation, we now
know that nearly all plan targets in the Soviet economy were denominated in rubles.
The most important control figures decided by the Politburo, the annual investment
plan and the defence budget, including the plan for military procurements from
industry, were measured in rubles. So were almost all important plan targets that had
binding significance on production ministries and enterprises. Those few targets fixed
by the centre in physical units, for example tons of steel, usually had an indicative
status which was more than propaganda but less than operational command. Thus, the
Politburo might announce a five–year plan target for steel tonnage; still, the directive
plan for the steel industry for the year emerged in rubles. At lower levels plans for the
gross value of output of sectors or enterprises might be accompanied by side
conditions for physical assortment, but the latter were inevitably controlled with a
lower degree of stringency.
The percentage degree of plan fulfilment helped to determine the private rewards
available to producers. The value of output reported from below was compared with
the value of output planned from above. Traditional payment schemes involved a
substantial jump in the premium as 100 per cent was achieved, giving producers a
strong incentive to fulfil the plan or overfulfil it by a small margin. As a result,
producers also faced strong incentives to report output at higher prices than those
assumed in the plan. At a higher price level they could secure the rewards associated
with plan fulfilment with less real output and less productive effort, thus improving
their ratio of reward to effort at the authorities’ expense.
The authorities, on the other hand, had a strong incentive to resist this pressure.
Inflation in plan fulfilment figures meant less real output and a reduction in the real
rents at the disposal of the centre. A mechanism designed with the obvious intention
of ruling out fulfilment of the plan through inflation was the fixing of plan prices in
relation to a base year. Thus production plans were denominated in “unchanged”
prices of a previous benchmark year; for example, 1926/27 was used for the period
from 1928 to 1950; from 1952 the prices of 1950 were used, and so on.
The authorities’ problem was to prevent inflation of plan prices. If producers
could hide inflation from planners, or secure their collusion in hiding it, then
producers could fulfil the plan with less real output and secure the associated rewards
with less productive effort. The basis of producers’ discretion was their grasp of the
initiative in price–setting for new, improved, or unique products and, for construction
units, in contracting for unique projects. For such products and projects a benchmark
plan price did not exist, had to be invented, and was generally based on the
producer’s initial experience of unit costs.
Producers’ main opportunity to influence plan prices lay therefore in product
innovation. If a product had been introduced or upgraded at a date more recent than
the base year for plan prices, its factory price from the period of its introduction was
used for the plan price. Planners controlled both the assortment profile of the plan and
the setting of plan prices with difficulty. Producers were therefore enabled to exploit
product innovation to achieve a given gross value of output in plan rubles with less
effort in three respects (Harrison, 1998). First, when nominal unit costs were rising,
4they skewed the assortment profile of output towards newer products. Second, they
inflated the costs at which new and upgraded products were priced. Third, they
simulated innovation with no other intention than to free themselves from established
plan prices (Berliner, 1952 and 1976). The result was a upward drift in plan prices
that was concealed from the planners at the time but detectable after the event
(Harrison, 2000).
1.2. Factory prices and liquidity
In the stereotype of the Soviet system propagated by its founders, what mattered was
real resources: the plan steered the real economy, and money followed the plan. From
the start, however, reality was different (Gregory and Tikhonov, 2000). The danger
was not just one of private embezzlement as Shleifer and Vishny supposed; even
loyal agents of the Soviet economic system were strongly motivated to acquire
financial surpluses on behalf of their enterprises (Belova, 2001). The uses of
enterprise liquidity were many but in particular to provide for incentive payments to
workers and supply agents (tolkachi) and to engage in siphoning the resources away
from the retail market that were required by the enterprise to fulfill its plan.
To create reserves of liquidity safe from confiscation by the state budgetary
authorities, enterprises had to secure hidden revenues over and above officially listed
factory prices. The desire for liquidity was strongly felt in enterprises’ price–setting
behaviour. The opportunity for factory price inflation arose during the negotiation of
contracts between suppliers and users which translated aggregate plans at the level of
production ministries into specific assignments and delivery obligations. It suited
both planners and producers that plans were issued only in a highly aggregated form;
this freed planners from responsibility for issuing specific assignments and gave
producers maximum freedom of action in deciding how to meet them (Belova and
Gregory, 2001). In a seller’s market the inevitable result was an annual ritual played
out between ardent suitors (purchasers) and reluctant brides (producers), which
became known as the “contracts campaign”. During this process suppliers used all
sorts of strategems to extract advantage from potential purchasers. In the defence
industry, for example, in addition to unauthorised increases in prices of established
products we find demands for illegal advance payments, demands for contracts in
which prices were specified “provisionally” and subject to review in the light of
actual costs, exaggeration of costs, refusal to permit their verification, withholding of
evidence concerning actual costs, delaying coming to terms until well into the
contract period, and refusal to come to an agreement at all unless concessions were
made (Harrison and Simonov, 2000).
The inflationary proclivities of producers were taken for granted at the highest
level. When Stalin’s Politburo discussed the year’s investment plan it was understood
that ambitious real plans converted into rubles would be partly eroded by higher
construction costs: the building industry would respond to a larger budget by raising
costs above estimate prices (Davies, 2001). Consequently the annual investment plan
was set, and at times limited, in the light of this perception.
In summary the archives provide us with compelling and robust evidence of
producers’ preferences with regard to own–product prices. These were uniformly
inflationary. Even a single example of a producer seeking a lower official price has
yet to be found.3 In the next section we present an analytical framework within which
this behaviour may be understood.
                                                
3 In fact wholesale and retail prices fell rarely, and then only as a result of
administrative fiat. Policies of general price deflation were pursued on two occasions.
In the early years of World War II the authorities subjected weapon prices to
substantial downward pressure to force productivity gains from mass production to be
reflected in lower budgetary costs of military procurement (Harrison, 1996). Again,
52. Plan–Setting and Effort–Setting
2.1. Plan–Setting
In the Soviet command economy for each period and each firm planners set a target
for the real gross value of output. This target was expressed in plan rubles, being
calculated as a quantity vector q* multiplied by a vector of official prices p–1 that held
in the previous or base period. In practice, however, planners could not effectively
compel firms to fulfil the plan at base–period prices. They tried to authorise only
those changes in product–unit prices that left the level of prices per unit of
characteristics unchanged, but the stream of continuous alterations in the product
assortment and product characteristics left planners unable to detect the hidden
inflation associated with simulated product innovation. Inflation was concealed and
the planners were fooled when the firm pushed up product–unit prices faster than the
value to the user of any improvement in product characteristics, or when product–unit
prices remained constant despite some unreported deterioration of product quality.
As a result the planners had to be satisfied ex post with any real output vector q
that, combined with a new current price vector p set by firms and subject to planners’
limited scrutiny of price alterations, matched the ruble total set by them ex ante :
1. ( )1
1
*q p q
p -
= × × .
This equation is represented in figure 1 by the PS or plan–setting curve, which was
unit–elastic and passed through 1, *p q-  when 1p p-=  and there was no hidden
inflation. In general we will only be concerned with that part of the PS curve that lies
above the horizontal line marking 1p p-= . The vertical axis in figure 1 represents the
true price level, not the official one, and includes the inflation that that the planners
failed to detect. The section of the PS curve above the p–1 line therefore shows the rate
at which producers could trade real output for hidden inflation while continuing to
satisfy the plan. Similarly, the horizontal axis measures not official real output but
true real output, corrected for the exaggerated claims that producers made for the
quality of their products in order to fool the plan–setter.
2.2. Effort–Setting
From the firm’s point of view output was costly, but so was the concealment of
inflation, because both required the exertion of effort. Suppose the firm’s utility to
have been based on its members’ wage income w and leisure l:
                                                                                                                               
in the early 1950s the authorities pursued a policy of stabilising money wages and
allowing living standards to rise by forcing down retail prices (Davies, 1958). These
were discretionary acts of high–level policy, and tell us nothing about producers’
preferences or motivations.
PS
real output
price
p–1
Figure 1. The plan–setting curve
q*
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If the firm satisfied the planners’  target it received a fixed wage w; otherwise, it
received nothing: this is the classical Soviet incentive scheme in a simplified form
(Nove, 1958). We assume that leisure and income interact, so the firm required at
least some of both. In order to have any income at all the firm had first to satisfy the
output target, and then it could also maximise leisure; the firm behaved
lexicographically although its utility was not lexicographic. The significance of a
“quiet life” for Soviet enterprises can be found in studies as far back as that of
Berliner (1952). The firm maximised leisure subject to a resource constraint that we
shall treat initially as hard:
3. 01 =--- lie
where e is productive effort, i is the effort required to simulate innovation and so
conceal inflation, and the firm’s initial time endowment is normalised to 1.
Finally, there were two technologies, one for the production of output a and one
for the concealment of inflation x. Production required effort to be combined with
capital k, but for now we will treat capital as an exogenous resource. Inflation
concealment required effort alone. In both activities, returns to effort diminished:
4. ( ), , ( ) 0, ( ) 0q a k e a e a e¢ ¢¢= > <
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Then, for any given level of overall effort that it chose to set, the firm faced a feasible
set of combinations of real output and hidden inflation that was concave to the origin
(see the appendix, proposition 1). In figure 2 this is shown as the ES or effort–
setting curve.
For each firm there was a family of ES curves, one for each feasible level of
effort. As the firm set its effort level higher, the ES curve moved outwards in all
directions (proposition 2). An improvement in production technology shifted the
whole ES family to the right, raising real output for given effort and given hidden
inflation. An improvement in the concealment technology shifted the whole ES
family upward, raising hidden inflation for given effort and given real output
(proposition 3).
2.3. The Firm’s Equilibrium
The firm’s problem, faced with a given PS, was to allocate effort between production
and inflation concealment such that the plan was fulfilled and effort was set at a
minimum. This point is found where the plan–setter’s line is tangential to the lowest
Figure 2. The effort–setting curve
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7available effort–setter’s line as in figure 3, and it determines the equilibrium values of
real output and hidden inflation simultaneously.
When the properties of this model are explored, it turns out to have the following
features. Figure 4 illustrates changes in technologies. In each panel the firm’s initial
equilibrium is shown at point A. From figure 2, an improvement in production
technology right–shifts ES, raising real output for given effort ( )01 l-  and given
hidden inflation. In figure 4, since the ES curve for 0l  lies partly outside the PS
curve, the firm may fall back to a lower ES curve with reduced overall effort ( )11 l- ,
where 1 0l l> . The ES curve with better production technology and less effort is
skewed to the right compared with the old one. Because returns to effort invested in
production have risen relative to the returns to effort invested in fooling the planners
q
p
p–1
Figure 3. The firm’s equilibrium
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Figure 5. A rise in plan tension
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8the firm also trades along the PS curve from A to B, substituting more real output for
less hidden inflation.
From figure 2, conversely, an increase in planners’ susceptibility to being fooled
up–shifts ES, raising hidden inflation for given effort and given real output. In figure
4 the firm is again able to fall back to a lower ES curve with reduced overall effort
( )1 0l l> , and is also able to substitute concealment effort for productive effort, so at
the new equilibrium C there is more hidden inflation and less real output.
Figure 5 illustrates a rise in plan tension. Other things being equal, an increase in
q* right–shifts PS. The firm is forced to move to a higher ES curve. At the new
equilibrium B there is less leisure ( )1 0l l< and more real output. However,
diminishing returns to productive effort mean that it would not be efficient for the
firm to meet the higher plan solely by increasing real output. Some of the extra effort
will go into fooling the planners. Therefore real output rises by less than q* and there
is also more hidden inflation.
Simple extensions of the model suggest conditions under which the command
system may break down. These conditions include both excessive liberalism and
excessive harshness. First, suppose the plan was set at a level that could not be
fulfilled with any combination of real output and hidden inflation given the firm’s
hard resource constraint. Producers would then prefer zero effort, zero reward, and
zero utility to the negative utility created by trying and failing to fulfil the plan; there
would be no hidden inflation, but output would collapse to the origin. Second, if
prices were liberalised within the command system producers would use their
increased discretion to climb the PS curve, raising prices without limit and cutting
real output to a minimum. Sounds familiar? It should: it happened in Russia between
1989 and 1992 (Harrison, 2001).
3. Siphoning and Corruption
3.1. A Single Transaction
The foregoing analysis was carried out under the assumption that the enterprise was
subject to a hard resource constraint. In fact, while resources were constrained for the
economy as a whole, for the individual firm the resource constraint could be softened
by siphoning and the substitution of outside resources for insider effort. Our attempt
to capture the outcome will resemble the Shleifer–Vishny story of the bribe in some
respects, but in our initial model the bribe is collected in order to fulfil the plan, not to
line pockets. The result is that, with plan–setting unchanged, real output rises while
both hidden inflation and insider effort fall; however, there is also an increase in the
inflation experienced by consumers.
Subsequently we will go on to examine the implications of bribe–taking for
personal enrichment, or embezzlement. However, unlike Vishny and Shleifer we do
not regard embezzlement as the general case. We will draw a distinction between
corruption and disloyalty. All managers were potentially corrupt, but only disloyal
managers used the proceeds for personal enrichment. Think of an agent’s loyalty as
an investment in the perceived alignment of her objectives with those of superiors and
inferiors in the vertical administrative hierarchy. For many purposes it is reasonable
to presume that managers, however corrupt, remained rationally loyal. First,
managers invested in loyalty to their superiors for the sake of their careers: to get
promotion, they needed a record of plan fulfilment. This record also relied on meeting
the needs of inferiors and maintaining their cooperation, so managers also had to
invest in loyalty to the workforce. Disloyalty in either direction, upward or
downward, prejudiced career aspirations. Second, the cash return to disloyalty may
have been hard to spend on personal consumption, both because of the seller’s market
and also because of the need to avoid attracting attention.
9Belova (2001) reports what she calls the “honest” manager’s dilemma, but in this
system no one was completely honest, so we will call it the dilemma of the loyal
manager. To fulfil the plan, the manager had to compete for scarce supplies that the
planners forgot, or promised but did not deliver. To compete, she had to pay.
Payments went to private supply agents (tolkachi), sideline suppliers of deficit
commodities, and workers for the extra effort required to make bricks without straw.
For our purposes we will emphasise siphoning: in order to augment their own
productive stocks firms entered the retail market as purchasers of commodities
intended for purchase by households for personal consumption. For this purpose the
loyal manager had to acquire discretionary liquidity by creating revenues that were
hidden from the planners. She got the liquidity from her purchasers by securing an
above–list price, or advance payment, or bribe, but, in distinction from the the
Shleifer–Vishny story, the bribe was paid into the firm’s account.
First, rewrite the firm’s production function from equation (4), adding Dk  to
represent the availability of an outside resource that substitutes perfectly for the
firm’s inside stocks of fixed and working capital:
6. ( ), , 0, ( , ) 0, ( , ) 0q a k k e k a k k e a k k e¢ ¢¢= + D D > + D > + D < .
In order to get hold of Dk  the firm requires hidden revenue for discretionary use in the
secondary market where commodities are traded that are of potential intermediate
use. This hidden revenue must be over and above the liquidity officially allocated in
the firm’s financial plan. The firm extracts this hidden revenue in advance from
consumers in its own product market: the hidden revenue gathered in the previous
period, 1b- , is used to add to the firm’s real resources in the current period. We model
this as follows: there is a market–clearing price pˆ  of output that exceeds the official
price p at all relevant levels of output. The firm can capture some proportion of the
gap in the form of an advance payment, side payment, or markup over its officially
listed product price without being detected; for simplicity we can set this proportion
at 100 per cent without affecting basic results. The firm uses its hidden revenue as
discretionary purchasing power in the secondary market. The effect on the firm’s
resources is the outcome of a siphoning technology s in which the input is hidden
revenue but, since the secondary market too is a seller’s market, there are diminishing
returns:
7. ( )1 , 0, 0k s b s s- ¢ ¢¢D = > < ,
8. ( )1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ, 0,b q p p q p p- - - -= × - > > .
How will siphoning affect the ES curve? The result will be a new ES' curve that is
still concave (proposition 4) but right–shifted by comparison with the no–siphoning
case (proposition 5). For a baseline illustration, consider how the structure of the
firm’s incentives is changed in what we will call the “single–transaction” case. The
single transaction begins in period –1 when the firm sells a commodity in return for a
side–payment and recycles it through siphoning to acquire Dk. The same transaction
ends in period 0 when the firm uses Dk  to satisfy the plan–setter and augment its
utility, but the firm makes no provision for repeated siphoning of resources to be used
in period 1.Thus the single transaction takes two periods to complete, but the only
decision we analyse is the firm’s optimisation within the current period.
This case is illustrated in figure 6; it is practically identical with that of an
improvement in production technology shown in figure 4. The firm is initially subject
to a hard resource constraint. Given plan–setting, the firm is in equilibrium with the
solid effort–setting curve ES and leisure 0l  at point A. Softening its resource
constraint through siphoning enables the firm to produce more for given hidden
10
inflation and given effort. The dashed ES' curve in figure 4 illustrates the production–
augmenting effect of siphoning with effort held at 0l . Since ES' lies partly outside
the firm’s PS curve, it is not efficient for the firm to hold effort at this level. As long
as plan–setting remains unchanged, the firm will prefer to cut effort to 1l , yielding an
ES" line that, with augmented productive capital, is skewed to the right by
comparison with the no–siphoning ES curve and touches PS at B, a point showing
more real output and less hidden inflation.
In short, softening her resource constraint and tolerating corruption helped the
loyal manager to fulfil the plan with less effort, less hidden inflation, and more true
real output than would have been possible otherwise. This result suggests that not
only the firm gained; there was also less fooling of the planners, for whom there was
a clear rationale to turn a blind eye to the rule–breaking involved since in the outcome
the plan was fulfilled more honestly. The welfare implications for consumers,
however, are ambiguous. There was more real output in a gross sense, but more of it
was diverted away from consumption and recycled back into production. Moreover,
consumers paid more for the output that was supplied to them through some
combination of open inflation and covert side payments.
3.2. Loyal and Disloyal Managers
In this economy all managers were self–interested, and all managers were corruptible,
but the manager we have described so far remained loyal. Think of an agent’s loyalty
as measured by the degree of alignment of her objectives with those of superiors and
inferiors in the vertical administrative hierarchy. Managers invested in loyalty to their
superiors for the sake of their careers: to get promotion, they needed a record of plan
fulfilment. This record also relied on meeting the needs of inferiors and maintaining
their cooperation, so managers also had to invest in loyalty to the workforce. By
accepting illegal side–payments and disbursing them via the siphoning mechanism,
the manager fulfilled the plan and at the same time reduced the efforts of the
workforce. This manager was therefore loyal to both superiors and inferiors.
Were all managers loyal? For reasons given above we find it reasonable to
presume that managers, however corrupt, might rationally choose to remain loyal.
Nonetheless disloyal managers existed. If disloyal, they pocketed bribes for personal
enrichment, and failed to distribute gains among either planners or workers. They still
aimed to fulfill the plan but they were no longer minimising the workers’ or their own
efforts. It is widely held that disloyalty in this sense increased through time and
contributed to the decay of the Soviet command system under Brezhnev (Grossman,
1998). Therefore the implications of disloyalty deserve brief examination.
A manager might choose to be either completely or partly disloyal. A completely
disloyal manager embezzled all side payments for personal enrichment, so there
Figure 6. Siphoning: a single transaction
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would have been no siphoning and the firm’s resource constraint would remain hard.
In practice, we suggest that the scope for managerial disloyalty was always limited by
workers’ and planners’ responses. To explore these responses we specify the
distribution of information about disloyal behaviour by managers as follows. Suppose
that information about specific disloyal acts was only available to other agents within
the firm; above the firm, there was information only about the incidence of corruption
possibilities generally. If the manager was disloyal the workers knew, but the
planners could only suspect.
With respect to the workforce the manager with a disloyal propensity faced the
following problem. She could sufficiently maintain her reputation upwards by
fulfilling the plan. But to fulfil the plan the manager needed the cooperation of the
workers, who would have knowledge of her disloyalty. The workers might threaten to
withhold effort, or alternatively to betray her wrong–doing, as a means of inducing
her to share the gains from corruption. In principle this sharing might be done in two
ways. First, the corrupt manager might distribute part of the bribe revenue directly to
the workforce in cash, but on our understanding of the context and evidence this was
detectable, therefore dangerous, and seldom done. Instead, managers bought
cooperation by transforming cash rents into additional resources through siphoning
and sharing the gain with the workers in the form of leisure. In this form the
redistribution of rents was less visible to higher–level audit or even took on a “good”
appearance. As a result, for a given plan insiders’ effort fell. In short, complete
disloyalty was an infeasible choice. Self–interested managers were always at least
partly loyal.
Consider the problem of the same disloyal manager in relation to plan–setters.
Plan–setters did not know firms’ intrinsic capacity, nor the extent of disloyalty, nor
the extent to which bribes were recycled into siphoning. They knew there was
corruption, that siphoning might occur as a result, that siphoning enlarged firms’
capacity, and that even disloyal managers would rationally choose to recycle some
bribes into siphoning. They knew therefore that when there was siphoning the effort
level and the utilisation of capacity would tend to fall with an unchanged plan; this
case was illustrated in figure 6. By setting plans “from the achieved level” planners
aimed to avoid a slackening of efforts. Thus they would rationally respond to their
knowledge of corruption possibilities by tautening the plan.
A possible outcome for a single transaction is shown in figure 7. The gain in the
firm’s capacity for a given level of effort is the shift from ES to ES'. The increase in
plan tension is shown in the shift from *0q  to 
*
1q , and the associated shift from PS to
PS' . In the case of a corrupt but loyal manager this increase exactly captures the
firm’s additional resources, moving its equilibrium from A to B. At B, effort is the
same as at A. Managers’ loyalty has resulted in the gains being shared with the
*
0q
*
1q
Figure 7. A rise in plan tension with siphoning
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planners through the increase in real output, but real output has risen less than in
proportion to the rise in plan tension and there is also higher hidden inflation.
The disloyal manager wished to pocket the gain herself. But she still had to
maintain her reputation with plan–setters by fulfilling the plan. Since the planners’
knowledge of corruption possibilities led them set a higher plan, the disloyal manager
now had to get the workers to work harder. For this she again required the workers’
cooperation, and this forced her to share the proceeds of corruption with the workers
by engaging in siphoning to enlarge capacity and spread effort. In short, when
managers were corrupt raising plan tension was a mechanism to limit disloyalty. But
the converse was also the case: reducing plan tension could promote embezzlement by
corrupt managers. This result establishes a clear mechanism that links the spread of
corruption in the Soviet economy in the 1970s with the simultaneous reduction of
growth targets (on corruption see Grossman, 1977, and on growth targets and growth
Schroeder, 1985).
4. Repeated Siphoning
A single–transaction framework does not allow us to address the question prompted
by the Shleifer–Vishny model: in the presence of corruption, may the producer gain
by restricting output? In the single–transaction model the value of side payments is
fixed beforehand. Effort is not optimised from the point of view of supplying the
market in such a way as to secure further side payments as a basis for repeated
siphoning. However, side–payments depend on the gap between the market–clearing
price and the official price. When siphoning is repeated over several periods this gap
can be determined simultaneously with the effort–setting decision, since market–
clearing and official prices both decline, but at differing rates, as output rises. The
official price varies inversely with output along the PS curve, the latter being unit
price–elastic. The market–clearing price varies inversely with output along the
demand curve as the balance in the market shifts from seller to buyer. Therefore,
rewrite equations (8) and (9) in continuous time:
9. ( ) 0,0, <¢¢>¢=D ssbsk ,
10. ( )ˆ ˆ, 0,b q p p q p p= × - > > ;
and add a market demand curve, linear for the sake of illustration:
11. ˆ , , 0p z q zp p= - × > .
Consider the behaviour of the firm’s hidden revenues as real output increases. We
do not model this formally but we observe that it depends on the relative elasticities
of the PS and market demand curves. The PS curve, which could also be termed the
planner’s demand curve, determines open revenues but is unit–elastic: the firm must
achieve a fixed total planned revenue, which in this context becomes a lump–sum tax.
Assume for simplicity that the firm succeeds in extracting all the side payments that
the market will bear; then, the market demand curve determines the firm’s total
revenue. It is downward–sloping and linear so its elasticity falls as output rises.
Where the elasticity of the market demand curve equals unity, the firm’s total revenue
is maximised and, since its planned revenues are a lump sum, its hidden revenues are
also maximised.
Consider figure 8. The siphoning firm operates in the “shortage” region of the
diagram, in the region between q  and q  where the market–clearing price exceeds the
official price; it is also a necessary condition that both prices exceed the baseline plan
price 1p- . In this region, assuming that the firm is able to extract the market price on
its total output, the gap between the PS and D (market–demand) curves represents the
firm’s hidden revenue per unit of output. It maximises its total hidden revenues
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midway between q  and q , which is also the point where marginal revenue becomes
zero and the marginal revenue curve, drawn with slope 1
2p
- , meets the quantity axis
(drawn in this figure at 0p = , not 1p p-= ). On either side of this point hidden
revenues diminish, falling to zero at q  and q .
When siphoning is repeated, what is now the effect of endogenising side
payments on the ES curve? The effect is as if a blister were to appear on the ES curve
in the region between q  and q . In the single–transaction case (figure 6), the whole
ES curve was right–shifted in favour of higher real output. When siphoning is
repeated and hidden revenues are endogenous, the rightward drift of the ES surface is
limited to the region already identified, the drift reaching a maximum extent at the
level of output where hidden revenues are maximised. This drift is determined by the
PS and D curves alone, and there is therefore an identical blister on each ES curve in
the family of curves as shown in figure 9.
How does repeated siphoning influence the PS–ES  equilibrium? In principle the
effect of siphoning on the firm’s initial equilibrium depends on three things: the
location of its initial equilibrium, the point–elasticity of market demand for output at
that equilibrium, and the size of the siphoning blister. Several cases are possible,
including some that do not result in a siphoning equilibrium: for example, a firm
Figure 8. Hidden revenues
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Figure 9. The ES' curve with repeated siphoning
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encountering a siphoning blister that is small and far to the left or right of the initial
equilibrium might find it unprofitable to siphon. There appear to be two possible
cases when the siphoning blister is near enough and large enough for the firm to
exploit. The difference between them is the location of the point of maximum hidden
revenues relative to the no–siphoning equilibrium or, in other words, the elasticity of
the market demand curve relative to that of the PS curve at the no–siphoning
equilibrium.
To illustrate this point for simplicity rewrite equation (10) such that the
relationship between hidden revenues and resources siphoned becomes linear with
constant returns. Now siphoning is maximised where hidden revenues are maximised.
Thus, when the market demand curve is more elastic than the PS curve and hidden
revenues are increasing, the siphoning blister increases the slope of the ES' curve;
conversely, when the market demand curve is inelastic and hidden revenues are
falling, the siphoning blister reduces the slope of the ES' curve. If ES' is made flatter
then the siphoning equilibrium will tend to shift in favour of higher output;
conversely, if steeper, then the siphoning equilibrium will tend to shift in favour of
higher hidden inflation.
These are illustrated in figure 10, with the no–siphoning equilibrium marked at
point A in each case. Suppose that, with a low value of p , the market demand curve
is still elastic at the no–siphoning equilibrium; then for given output the ES' curve
will become flatter, and the siphoning equilibrium will tend to shift in favour of
higher output. Intuitively, the firm that faces elastic market demand loses hidden
revenue by restricting output. Instead, up to a point dictated by diminishing returns to
effort and liquidity the firm produces extra output, takes the extra hidden revenue,
and uses it to buy extra inputs. For insider effort set at  ( )01 l-  the ES curve expands
to ES'. This effort is above the efficient level, so the firm cuts effort to the lower ES"
where effort is ( )11 l- and 1 0l l> . The outcome is an equilibrium at B with less
hidden inflation and more real output.
Conversely suppose that, with a higher value of p , the market demand curve is
already inelastic at the no–siphoning equilibrium; then for given output the ES' curve
will be made steeper, and the siphoning equilibrium will tend to shift in favour of
higher concealed inflation. The firm facing inelastic demand can raise hidden revenue
from side payments by restricting output. This case is more consonant with the
stylised facts of a shortage economy proposed by Shleifer and Vishny. But in our case
the firm, while restricting output to increase hidden revenues, must still satisfy the
planners. It does so by diverting effort released by external resources siphoned from
the secondary market to hiding inflation rather than producing output. In figure 10 the
outcome at C is more hidden inflation and less real output.
Figure 10. Repeated siphoning
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These cases suggest that when siphoning was repeated successive increases in
plan tension would no longer necessarily shift the firm’s equilibrium towards higher
levels of real output. This is because the firm’s point of maximum hidden revenues
was fixed by the market demand curve. Other things being equal, a rise in plan
tension shifted the firm’s no–siphoning equilibrium to the right, and at the same time
the probability increased that the no–siphoning equilibrium would drift to the right of
the point where the firm’s hidden revenues were maximised. At this point the firm
might rationally choose to curtail any further increase in real output which would
drive down hidden revenues and reduce siphoned resources. This placed an ultimate
limit on the ability of the planner to raise plan tension so as to maintain productive
effort and raise real output when siphoning was repeated.
Other things being equal, however, an increase in plan tension would reduce the
scope for both corruption and siphoning. This is evident from figure 8: the firm may
extract a net surplus of hidden revenues only when market demand exceeds planned
revenues. An increase in the firm’s planned output requires the firm to engage in
some combination of producing more output and driving up its official price more
vigorously, and the result is to limit the firm’s corruption opportunities possibilities.
In short, when siphoning was repeated and firms responded to the resulting
possibilities with adverse effects on real output, regardless of whether managers were
loyal or disloyal, tautening the plan was a mechanism to limit corruption and
corruption oriented behaviour. Conversely, reducing plan tension increased the scope
for both corruption and disloyalty.
5. Conclusions
First, we find no evidence that Soviet producers set prices below market–clearing
levels so as to collect bribes for personal gain. On the contrary, they engaged in
concealed inflation so as to fulfill the plan more easily at prices higher than those
foreseen in the plan. Thus the Shleifer–Vishny conjecture does not correspond with
significant aspects of producer behaviour under the Soviet command system.
Second, we have presented an analytical framework within which a plan–setter
and an effort–setter interact, subject to a hard resource constraint, to determine real
output and hidden inflation simultaneously.
Third, there was a clear rationale for plan–setters to permit softening of the firm’s
resource constraint through siphoning. Managers allocated resources that were gained
corruptly to produce more real output with less hidden inflation and fulfill the plan
more honestly as a result. Self–interested managers, however corrupt, always
remained at least partly loyal to the goals of planners and workers. Moreover, by
increasing plan tension plan–setters could influence disloyal managers to recycle
more hidden revenues into production. Thus, tautening the plan limited managerial
disloyalty.
Fourth, we have qualified these results for the case of siphoning repeated in
continuous time. In this case higher real output was not the invariable consequence.
But raising plan tension remained an effective mechanism for limiting the scope for
corruption and adverse corruption–oriented behaviour.
Finally, our findings reflect on the relationship between corruption and shortage.
We are far from convinced by the argument that the shortage economy was created
with the purpose of distributing bribes into private pockets. It is clear that corruption
was enabled as one consequence of the shortage economy, and that it was tolerated by
planners for their own purposes. Corruption was commonly part of a process that
aligned the objectives of planners and producers, rather than a process of private
enrichment involving disloyalty as well as corruption. However, planners could
influence the scope for both corruption and disloyalty through the degree of plan
tension, and we argue that reductions in plan tension in the 1970s contributed to the
dissipation of rents in the Soviet economy.
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Appendix. The Effort–Setting Curve
Symbols
a production technology
e effort in production
i effort in concealment of inflation
k capital
l leisure
p official price
q real output
t plan target
x inflation concealment technology
Plan–setting and effort–setting
Consider a firm that operates subject to two constraints. The first constraint is the PS
or plan–setting line: its real output at official prices must match its target in rubles at
plan prices, 1 *p q- × , deflated by the current official price level:
A1. ( )1
1
*q p q
p -
= × × .
Second is a resource constraint, where the firm’s time endowment is normalised to 1:
A2. 01 =--- lie .
The firm has two activities. Production requires capital and effort. To begin with only
effort is variable; effort is also subject to diminishing returns:
A3. 1 , 0 1q a k ea a a-= × × < < .
The concealment of inflation in the price at which the firm’s plan target is to be
fulfilled requires only effort, again subject to diminishing returns:
A4. 10,
1
1 <<×=-
-
- bbix
p
pp ,
where p is concealed from the plan–setter in the current period.
For reasons given in the text the firm’s problem, given the plan–setter’s line, is
reduced to allocating effort between production and inflation concealment so as to
fulfil the plan with minimum overall effort. This point is found where PS, the plan–
setting line (equation A1), is tangential to the lowest effort–setting line or ES (from
A2, A3, and A4):
A5. 
1
1 1
1
1 p pq a k
x p
a
b
a l- -
-
é ù
æ ö-ê ú= × × - - ç ÷ê ú×è øê úë û
.
The ES curve
Proposition 1. The tangential line of the ES curve is negative. In addition, the ES
curve is strictly concave: the marginal rate of substitution decreases as p increases.
Proof:
The partial derivative of q with respect to p is less than zero:
19
11 1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 11 p p p pq a k
p x p x p x p
a
b b
a a l
b
-
-
- - -
- - -
é ù
æ ö æ ö æ öæ ö- -¶ ê ú= × × - - × -ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷ê ú¶ × × ×è øè ø è ø è øê úë û
.
Set 01
1
1
1 >
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
×
-
--=
-
-
b
l
px
pp
A , and 0
1
1 >÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
×
-
=
-
-
px
pp
B .
Then 
11
1
1
q a k
A B
p x p
ba
a ba
b
--
-
-
¶ × ×= - ×
¶ × ×
and 0<
¶
¶
p
q .
Moreover, the second derivative of q with respect to p is also negative:
2 1 1 22 1
2
2
1 1
( 1) 1 1 1q a k
A B B
p x p x p
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b b b
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-
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1<a
and 
2
2 0
q
p
¶
<
¶
, suggesting that the ES curve is strictly concave to the origin.
Proposition 2. A reduction in leisure expands the ES curve; the new curve lies outside
the old curve at all points.
Proof:
This proposition is investigated through the effects on the p– and q–intercepts of the
ES curve arising from a decline in the value of l . The p–intercept is found by setting
0=q  in equation A5:
A6. ( )1 1 1p p x
b
l- é ù= × × - +ë û .
Similarly the q–intercept is found from equation A5 by setting 1-= pp :
A7. ( )1 1q a k aa l-= × × - .
Other things being equal, when l  declines, both the p–  and q–intercepts increase:
the ES curve expands in all directions.
Proposition 3. An improvement in production (concealment) technology shifts the ES
curve toward output (concealed inflation).
Proof:
Consider equations A6 and A7. When a increases and other variables are held equal,
the q–intercept increases while the p–intercept stays the same: the ES curve is right–
shifted toward higher real output. A similar proof applies to the converse case of an
increase in x when other variables are controlled.
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Effort–Setting and Siphoning: a Single Transaction
Let the firm siphon capital–augmenting resources kD  from the retail market so its
production function becomes:
A8. ( )1q a k k ea a-= × + D × .
The ES curve with siphoning (the ES' curve) becomes:
A9. ( )
1
1 1
1
1
p p
q a k k
x p
a
ba
l
- -
-
é ù
æ ö-ê ú= × + D × - - ç ÷ê ú×è øê úë û
.
Proposition 4. The ES' curve is concave to the origin: the marginal rate of
substitution decreases as p increases.
Proof:
Because kD  is predetermined, its influence on equation A9 compared with equation
A5 is purely scalar. Therefore, the proof suggested for proposition 1 is also applicable
to this proposition. In other words, the signs of the first and second derivatives of q
with respect to p for the ES' curve are the same as those for the ES curve.
Proposition 5. Siphoning shifts the ES curve toward real output.
Proof:
Because kD  is predetermined, its influence on equation A9 compared with equation
A5 is identical to that of capital accumulation or a technological improvement, i.e. an
increase in 1a k a-× . Therefore, the proof suggested for proposition 3 is also applicable
to this proposition, writing ( )1a k k a-× + D  for 1a k a-×  in equation A7.
